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Introduction 
 
As one of the oldest and most valuable crops grown in American history, the value of 
corn has been evident for centuries. The only crop grown in every state, corn is the United 
States’ number one agricultural commodity. The research to find new and innovative ways to use 
corn is ongoing. One such use that has reached the headlines recently is ethanol production. 
While not a new technology, the value of ethanol is responsible for keeping it at the front of 
researchers’ minds.  
This study analyzes the effectiveness of the current United States ethanol production, 
specifically the effect of ethanol plants on corn markets; a comparison of the prices of U.S. 
produced ethanol with prices of ethanol imports; and profitability of ethanol production under 
alternative gasoline and corn price scenarios.  
The use of ethanol as a fuel in the United States dates back to at least 1908. In an attempt 
to increase the use of homegrown renewable fuels, Henry Ford designed his Model Ts to run on 
either gasoline or pure ethanol. Ethanol again gained much attention in the 1970s when the 
Middle East limited the United States’ oil supply (DiPardo). In recent years, ethanol has once 
again become a popular issue due to the Clean Air Act and high gasoline prices.  
Energy is a hot topic at the front of Americans’ minds these days due to the high fuel 
prices of the past year. Oil prices have reached $70/barrel in the past year and show little sign of 
declining. One of the causes of this oil price spike is the pace of economic development of China 
and India and the accompanying increase in energy demand. Americans now face global 
competition for the oil they have taken for granted for so long. Also, recent media attention has 
focused on the diminishing oil supply in the world. Alternative fuels, including ethanol, continue 
to gain political and media attention as oil prices climb (Rask). 
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Ethanol’s environmentally friendly characteristics have opened up markets for ethanol 
use. Using an ethanol/ gasoline mix (gasohol) has significant environmental benefits. Studies 
show that use of a 10% ethanol/ 90% gasoline mix will reduce carbon monoxide emission by 
30% and net carbon dioxide emissions by 10% (Environmental Benefits). The percentage of 
ethanol in this mix could be raised to 20%, creating a nearly limitless market for ethanol. 
Currently, of the more than 137 million gallons of motor fuel used per month in the United 
States, only 15 % is gasohol (Highway Statistics). There is also a very large market for ethanol 
as an octane booster, as ethanol is replacing methyl tertiary butyl ether (MTBE). The use of 
MTBE is being phased out in several states, because of its negative effects on the environment. 
In a society that is increasingly conscience of the environment, a product with clean air qualities 
will continue to be very marketable in the coming years.  
Research similar to this study was completed in past decades. In 1985, a study titled, 
“The Impacts of Fuel Alcohol Production on Ohio’s Agricultural Sector” was conducted at The 
Ohio State University. The study analyzed the increased demand for corn with ethanol 
production, the ethanol co-product, and the price fluctuations due to both (Rask, et. al.). In 1993, 
Dr. Norman Rask of The Ohio State University and Dr. Kevin Rask of Colgate University 
conducted a study on the supply and demand of ethanol in the Western Hemisphere. The study 
explored the trade possibilities between the United States and Brazil and suggested policy 
changes (Rask and Rask). Since both of these studies were completed over ten years ago when 
oil prices where much lower, this study looks at the current market situation with today’s higher 
energy prices.  
The United States must take a look at the current ethanol policy to keep up with the ever 
changing energy market. What kind of effects does increased ethanol production have on local 
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cash grain markets? Can the current transportation system handle an increased supply of ethanol? 
This study takes a closer look at these questions to provide a clear picture of both the future of 
ethanol use in the United States and a path for ethanol policy.  
Objective 1 Introduction 
 Using cash grain prices, the first objective of this study analyzes the impact of the 
opening of an ethanol plant on local cash grain markets. With increased demand for corn, it is 
logical that the corn basis would strengthen. Over time, farmers may increase their corn acreage 
at the expense of soybean acreage to take advantage of the higher corn prices. This higher supply 
of corn will meet the increased demand for corn. Therefore, the author’s hypothesis is that the 
corn basis will not reflect significant change, because of the increased corn acreage.  
The impact of three different ethanol plants was measured: Tall Corn Ethanol, LLC, 
Lincolnland Agri-Energy, LLC, and VeraSun Energy Corporation. The plants were chosen based 
on availability of grain bids at local elevators, location, size, and opening date. These plants are 
outlined in Table1.  
Table 1. Ethanol Plants Analyzed in this Study
Plant Name Owner Capacity 
(MMGal/Yr) 
Production Start Location 
Aurora Plant VeraSun Energy 
Corporation 
120 March, 2004 Aurora, SD 
Lincolnland 
Agri-Energy, 
LLC 
Farmer Coop 48 July, 2004 Palestine, IL 
Tall Corn 
Ethanol, LLC 
Farmer Coop 49 August, 2002 Coon Rapids, IA 
 
 
Data 
 
 Since increased demand for corn from ethanol production would only affect local prices 
and not national prices, the difference between the local cash price and the Chicago Board of 
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Trade futures price, or the basis, was used to measure the impact of ethanol production. Local 
cash data was gathered for elevators near each ethanol plant from June, 1998 to July, 2005. For 
each plant, five nearby elevators were selected based on location and availability of bids.  
To analyze the impact of Tall Corn Ethanol, located in Coon Rapids, Iowa, bids were 
gathered from: West Central Coop, Halbur, IA; West Central Coop, Scranton, IA; West Central 
Coop, Templeton, IA; Farmers Coop, Bayard, IA; and Farmers Coop, Glidden, IA.  
To analyze the impact of VeraSun Energy Corp located in Aurora, South Dakota, bids 
were gathered from: AgFirst Farmers Coop, Aurora, SD; Bruce Farmers, Bruce, SD; AgFirst 
Farmers Coop, Brookings, SD; AgFirst Farmers Coop, White, SD; and AgFirst Farmers Coop, 
Toronto, SD.  
For Lincolnland Agri-Energy, in Palestine, Illinois, bids were gathered from: Bridgeport 
Grain, Bridgeport, IL; ConAgra, Carlisle, IN; LittleJohn Grain, Martinsville, IL; ConAgra-
Peavey, Shelburn, IN; and ADM, Sullivan, IN.  
Model and Estimation Results 
 
 An ordinary least squares model has been used to estimate the impact of an ethanol plant 
on local cash grain prices. The model estimated was: 
yt = α + βIt  
where yt  is the basis at time t and It is an indicator variable. It = 0 before the ethanol plant opened 
and It = 1 after the ethanol plant opened.  
 The regression analysis was first run with just the corn basis. Then, recognizing that the 
corn basis and the soybean basis tend to move together, a corn basis regression that included a 
soybean basis variable was run. 
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 In the following charts, a summary of the regression model is given. The coefficient for 
each variable is given. The first column is the α coefficient, which is before the ethanol plant 
opened. The second column, β, is the effect on local cash prices when the ethanol plant began 
production. The third column, SB, gives the effect of the ethanol plant on local cash prices after 
the soybean basis variable has been added. The t-statistic, which measures significance of the 
coefficient, is in parenthesis below the coefficient. Asterisks denote the p-value, another measure 
of coefficient significance. A p-value of 10% or less is denoted by one asterisk. A p-value of 5% 
or less, meaning more significance, is denoted by two asterisks. The last column of the chart 
gives the R2, which is a measure of the model’s significance. The higher the percentage, the 
more strength the correlation between the opening of an ethanol plant and changes in cash grain 
prices.  
Table 2. Tall Corn Ethanol Regression Summary
Tall Corn corn regression 
 α  β  SB  R2
Without the soybean variable        
West Central Coop, Halbur, IA -40.05  10.67    0.3370 
 (-71.06) ** (13.05) **    
        
West Central Coop, Scranton, IA -39.54  9.99    0.3200 
 (-70.42) ** (12.39) **    
        
West Central Coop, Templeton, IA -38.09  9.77    0.3264 
 (-70.98) ** (12.66) **    
        
Farmer's Coop, Glidden, IA -38.81  10.55    0.3330 
 (-73.45) ** (12.76) **    
        
Farmer's Coop, Bayard, IA -36.18  10.001    0.2805 
 (-62.76) ** (10.92) **    
        
With the soybean variable        
West Central Coop, Halbur, IA -37.11  8.922  0.0854  0.3952 
 (-49.59) ** (10.61) ** (5.671) **  
        
West Central Coop, Scranton, IA -36.69  8.249  0.0836  0.3829 
 (-50.28) ** (9.978) ** (5.755) **  
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West Central Coop, Templeton, IA -35.22  8.065  0.0825  0.3896 
 (-49.67) ** (10.19) ** (5.846) **  
        
Farmer's Coop, Glidden, IA -36.50  9.061  0.0678  0.3732 
 (-50.69) ** (10.46) ** (4.565) **  
        
Farmer's Coop, Bayard, IA -32.84  8.027  0.0997  0.3593 
 (-42.59) ** (8.692) ** (6.126) **  
 
 For Tall Corn Ethanol, the five plants monitored all show a positive impact on corn basis 
with the start of ethanol production. The model fits all five price series well. Without the soybean 
basis variable, the R2 is at least 28% for all five elevators. West Central Coop in Halbur, IA, and 
Farmer’s Coop in Glidden, IA, have the best fit with 33%.  When the soybean basis variable is 
added, the model fits even better, with all elevators showing an R2 of at least 35%.  
 In the model with the soybean basis variable included, the local corn prices around the 
Tall Corn Ethanol plant are significantly lower than Chicago prices; Bo ranges from -32 to -37. 
With the opening of the ethanol plant, the corn basis strengthened by eight to nine cents in each 
location and is also highly significant according to the p-values. A one cent change in the 
soybean basis is associated with a .06 to .10 cent change in the corn basis, indicating that some 
external factors are affecting both the corn basis and the soybean basis, such as transportation or 
fertilizer costs.  
Table 3. VeraSun Energy Corp. Regression Summary 
VeraSun corn regression 
 α  β  SB  R2
Without the soybean variable        
AgFirst Farmer's Coop, Aurora, SD -48.15  20.67    0.3159 
 (-52.85) ** (12.84) **    
        
AgFirst Farmer's Coop, Brookings, SD -49.02  21.46    0.3369 
 (-56.6785) ** (13.60031) **    
        
AgFirst Farmer's Coop, Toronto, SD -50.07  21.08    0.3150 
 (-49.18) ** (11.92) **    
        
AgFirst Farmer's Coop, White, SD -50.52  21.60    0.3314 
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 (-53.47) ** (12.94) **    
        
Bruce Farmer's, Bruce, SD -51.24  17.97    0.2074 
 (-51.19) ** (8.905) **    
        
        
With the soybean variable        
AgFirst Farmer's Coop, Aurora, SD -36.05  12.20  0.2678  0.5160 
 (-28.06) ** (7.751) ** (11.76) ** 
        
AgFirst Farmer's Coop, Brookings, SD -36.60  12.04  0.2717  0.5305 
 (-29.31) ** (7.833) ** (12.24) ** 
        
AgFirst Farmer's Coop, Toronto, SD -36.33  10.85  0.2766  0.5116 
 (-24.49) ** (6.226) ** (11.32) ** 
        
AgFirst Farmer's Coop, White, SD -36.95  12.06  0.2780  0.5254 
 (-26.43) ** (7.401) ** (11.78) ** 
        
Bruce Farmer's, Bruce, SD -33.12  5.455  0.3992  0.4851 
 (-20.28) ** (2.868) ** (12.76) ** 
 
 In the case of VeraSun Energy Corp., the model shows significant fit. Without the 
soybean basis variable, the R2 is 20% at Bruce Farmer’s in Bruce, SD, and at least 30% at the 
other four elevators. With the soybean basis variable, the R2 ranges from 49% at Bruce Farmer’s 
and 53% at AgFirst Farmer’s Coop in Brookings, SD.  
 In the VeraSun Energy Corp area, cash grain prices were also much lower than Chicago 
prices with Bo ranging from -33 to -36 in the model with the soybean basis variable included. 
The corn basis strengthened by five to twelve cents with the beginning of ethanol production, 
and this is highly significant as indicted by the p-values. A one cent change in soybean basis is 
associated with a 0.26 to 0.39 cent change in the corn basis, indicating that an external factor is 
affecting both.  
Table 4. Lincolnland Agri-Energy Regression Summary
Lincolnland corn regression 
 α  β  SB  R2
Without the soybean variable         
Bridgeport Grain, Bridgeport -11.32  1.44    0.0028 
 (-20.95) ** (0.9709)     
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LittleJohn Grain, Martinsville -15.77  -0.8882    0.0010 
 (-26.01) ** (-0.5616)     
        
ConAgra, Carlisle -15.77  -0.8882    0.001037 
 (-17.35) ** (-1.467)     
        
ConAgra-Peavey, Shelburn -11.08  -2.028    0.0029 
 (-19.18) ** (-0.9175)     
        
ADM, Sullivan  -11.03  0.4521    0.0002 
 (-20.33) ** (0.3086)     
        
With the soybean variable        
Bridgeport Grain, Bridgeport -10.35  0.4739  0.1674  0.1997 
 (-20.84) ** (0.3550)  (9.093) **  
        
LittleJohn Grain, Martinsville -11.92  0.2302  0.3492  0.3256 
 (-20.12) ** (0.1764)  (12.08) **  
        
ConAgra, Carlisle -9.356  -3.314  0.2042  0.2647 
 (-16.94) ** (2.499) ** (10.54) **  
        
ConAgra, Shelburn -8.814  0.3474  0.3388  0.3092 
 (-16.91) ** (0.1873)  (11.34) **  
        
ADM, Sullivan -9.940  -0.2173  0.2044  0.2496 
 (-20.81) ** (-0.1665)  (11.35) **  
 
 In the Lincolnland Agri-Energy case, the model does not show as much significance as 
the previous two cases. Without the soybean variable, the R2 is less than 1% at all five locations. 
When the soybean basis variable is added, the model fits much better. The lowest R2 is 20% at 
Bridgeport Grain in Bridgeport, IL, and the highest R2 is 32% at LittleJohn Grain in Martinsville, 
IL.  
 The local cash grain prices around the Lincolnland Agri-Energy are eight to eleven cents 
lower than the Chicago prices in the model that includes the soybean basis variable. No 
significant change is seen, though, when ethanol production begins. The Bo ranges from -3 to 0.4 
cents and the p-value indicates the numbers are not significant. A one cent change in the soybean 
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basis is associated with a 0.16 to 0.35 cent change in the corn basis, indicating that some external 
factor is affecting both the corn basis and the soybean basis.  
Acreage Effects 
 
 A least-squares regression model was run on the corn and soybean acreage in the counties 
that the ethanol plants and surrounding grain elevators are located. The results of this model 
show that increased demand for corn due to ethanol production has not changed the amount of 
acres being planted to corn versus soybeans. Corn and soybean acreage was obtained from the 
USDA National Agricultural Statistics Service. Table 5 shows the amount of corn and soybean 
acres harvested in the time period that grain bids were analyzed. The numbers in red indicate the 
year ethanol production began at each plant. The acreage is a combination of the counties in 
which the evaluated ethanol plant and local grain elevators are located.  
Table 5. Corn and Soybean Acres Harvested near Analyzed Ethanol Plants
Acres Harvested 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Corn        
Lincolnland 
      
301,198  
      
326,100  
      
338,900  
      
337,200  
      
313,800  
      
325,600  
      
338,400  
VeraSun 
      
313,000  
      
266,000  
      
330,000  
      
283,000  
      
300,800  
      
332,500  
      
362,300  
Tall Corn 
      
404,600  
      
410,800  
      
416,500  
      
408,500  
      
413,500  
      
409,500  
      
426,500  
Soybeans        
Lincolnland 
      
354,900  
      
345,800  
      
339,500  
      
354,700  
      
364,900  
      
337,600  
      
344,500  
VeraSun 
      
351,300  
      
401,700  
      
379,200  
      
394,500  
      
334,100  
      
359,900  
      
323,000  
Tall Corn 
      
386,700  
      
392,200  
      
391,200  
      
399,200  
      
380,800  
      
389,000  
      
373,400  
 
Objective 1 Conclusions 
 
 With the opening of Tall Corn Ethanol and VeraSun Energy, Corp, the local cash corn 
basis strengthened by at least eight cents. The model does not fit Lincolnland Agri-Energy as 
well. This may be due to the fact that Palestine, Illinois has close access to water transportation, 
allowing access to markets not accessible to the land-locked plants. Additionally, this river 
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access could open markets to Lincolnland Agri-Energy that are not available to the other two 
ethanol plants, which are not located near a river. Also, due to the river, a large amount of grain 
moves through the Palestine area, so the increased corn demand due to ethanol production is not 
significant enough to make a difference in the local corn basis.  
A significant change has not been seen in the corn/soybean acreage ratio, causing a 
rejection of the author’s hypothesis. This could be due to the short time span being analyzed. It is 
difficult to make a conclusion based on the Lincolnland and VeraSun cases, because the data 
does not extend beyond the year ethanol production began. There is data two years beyond the 
opening of Tall Corn Ethanol. As years pass, more acres could be dedicated to corn production to 
match the demand from the ethanol plant. Another factor that could contribute to this lack of 
acreage change could be farmers’ dedication to crop rotation. Farmers tend to be very committed 
to rotation and may not be willing to change for increased demand due to the ethanol plant. The 
weather also has a large impact on the corn and soybean acres planted. If there was a large 
amount of rain in the spring, more soybean acres may be planted, regardless of the corn demand.  
Objective 2 Introduction 
 
The second objective of this study was to analyze the United States’ current 
transportation system and trade situation as they relate to the country’s ability to supply growing 
ethanol markets. To analyze the current trade situation, production and transportation costs were 
gathered for both the United States and Brazil. A similar study, “Ethanol Policy in the Clean Air- 
Free Trade Era,” was conducted thirteen years ago. Since that study is over a decade old, the data 
will be reevaluated with the current high oil prices. It is hypothesized that lower production costs 
in Brazil will allow that country to produce and ship ethanol to the major U.S. markets cheaper 
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than production and transportation can occur within the U.S. Only the current tariff is keeping 
Brazil from importing large quantities.    
 The two largest ethanol markets in the U.S. are New York and California. In 2002, 
California used over 15 billion gallons of gasoline. 8.45% of the gasoline use was gasohol, a 
90% gasoline/10% ethanol blend. New York used over 5 billion gallons of gasoline in 2002, and 
only less than a percent was gasohol (Highway Statistics). Since then, both states have banned 
the use of MTBE as an octane booster and ethanol is used as a replacement (F.O. Licht and Agra 
CEAS Consulting 21). 
Due to the Renewable Fuels Standard passed in 2002, renewable fuel usage is projected 
to increase to five billion gallons per year by 2012. Assuming that most of this demand will be 
met by ethanol, use of ethanol will be more than doubled in the next six years (Review of 
Transportation). To transport the ethanol from the Midwest, where the majority of ethanol is 
produced in the US, to the markets on the coasts, barges and railways will be used. Pipelines and 
trucks can also be used, but they are rarely used to transport ethanol long distances because of 
special handling requirements. Therefore, they will not be considered in this study.  
 The majority of ethanol in the US is transported by rail. The current railway system will 
not need to make many changes to handle an increased supply of ethanol. Bottlenecks could 
occur with yard space, switch capacity, and at terminals. However, these problems are not 
impossible to overcome; they just require some special attention as the supply of ethanol moving 
across the US increases. Railway infrastructure can be improved much quicker than ethanol 
production can be increased in the Midwest (Review of Transportation).  
The other way ethanol is moved in the US is by water. The ethanol is loaded onto barges 
in the Midwest, where it is produced, shipped down the Mississippi River to the Gulf, and finally 
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moved around the coasts of the US. One advantage for shipping ethanol by water is that there are 
at least twice as many terminals to receive products by water than terminals to receive products 
by rail on both the east and west coasts. Increasing the supply of ethanol moved by waterways 
will be difficult for several reasons. First, the Mississippi River is already a very busy river, with 
projections of 1.3% growth annually. While the amount of ethanol moving down the river is a 
very small percentage of the total river traffic, increased ethanol shipments cause a few 
bottlenecks. The northern Mississippi River also freezes in the wintertime, slowing down barge 
traffic considerably. Once the ethanol reaches the gulf ports, it must be loaded onto ocean 
vessels. Some problems can also occur here with an increased supply of ethanol. The Merchant 
Maritime Act of 1920, commonly known as the Jones Act, and the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
limit the number of vessels that can be used for ethanol shipment. Under the Jones Act, vessels 
moving products from one US port to another must be American made, American owned, and 
American manned. The Oil Pollution Act requires that double hulled vessels must be used to 
move petroleum products. As a result of these two acts, a limited number of vessels are available 
to transport ethanol. Next, it takes an ocean vessel more than a month to get from the Gulf ports, 
through the Panama Canal, and up to California and further delays are common. This makes the 
ethanol supply in California, the largest ethanol user, very costly and difficult to manage 
(Review of Transportation).  
The trade of ethanol has been a popular topic in the media in recent years. Using 
sugarcane instead of corn, Brazil has cheaper ethanol production costs than the United States. 
Brazil also has a large supply and massive production capacity that far exceeds the country’s 
demand for ethanol. Seeing a large demand for ethanol in the U.S., Brazilian producers are 
looking for a way to tap into this potential market. Import duty taxes are making this very 
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difficult, but Brazilian producers have found a loophole to get ethanol into the U.S. Through the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative, El Salvador and other Caribbean countries can export several 
products to the United States, exempt from tariffs. Ethanol is one of these products, allowing up 
to a cap of 7% of the U.S. production or about 190 million gallons per year to be exported to into 
the U.S. Currently, about 45 million gallons of ethanol annually enter the country duty free 
through this initiative. Brazilian ethanol producers can ship ethanol to these countries and then 
into the U.S. to avoid the tariffs and take advantage of subsidies. Cargill, a large American 
agribusiness, has plans to take advantage of this loophole.  Cargill has announced a plan to build 
a 63 million gallon capacity ethanol plant in El Salvador that will import ethanol directly from 
Brazil, complete one small production step, and send into the United States, duty-free (Diaz).  
Currently the United States has a tariff of $0.54 per gallon on imported ethanol. In 
November 2005, according to the Renewable Fuels Association, ethanol demand in the US was 
297,000 barrels per day, while production was only 275,000 barrels per day. As a result, some 
ethanol must be imported into the U.S., despite the large tariff. In 2003, 176 million gallons of 
ethanol were imported. This is a 10.5% increase over the imports in 1998. The majority of these 
imports came from Saudi Arabia, with 40.1% of the U.S. imports. Other large shares come from 
Jamaica and Costa Rica, which both fall under the Caribbean Basin Initiative, so those imports 
do not have the tariff applied to them. Only ten million gallons of Brazilian ethanol were 
imported into the U.S. in 2003 (F.O. Licht and Agra CEAS Consulting 98).  
Data 
 
Production costs for the United States were collected from F.O. Licht and Agra CEAS 
Consulting’s “Ethanol Production Costs: A Worldwide Study.” Production costs for one gallon 
of ethanol are $0.94 at a dry mill ethanol plant with a 40 million gallon per year production 
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capacity. At a Brazilian port, the price of ethanol (FOB) is $0.86. This price, which is the 
production cost plus the transportation cost from the plant to the port, was found in the 2005 U.S. 
Trade Statistics.   
 Transportation costs were gathered from Brazil and the Midwest, where most US ethanol 
is produced, to New York and California, the largest ethanol markets. Midwest transportation 
costs were calculated from Chicago, Illinois, to New York Harbor and San Francisco, California. 
These costs were calculated by first obtaining rail costs for shipping ethanol. The rail costs were 
found at the CSX railway website and the Burlington Northern Santa Fe railway website. The 
barge costs were then calculated using relative prices from a previous study by Downstream 
Alternatives. The transport costs from Brazil to the US ports were calculated as follows: 
According to the US Trade Statistics, the average CIF price of Brazilian ethanol at US ports is 
$0.98. The FOB price of ethanol at Brazilian ports is $0.86. The difference between the two, 
$0.12, is the transport cost. The costs are summarized in Table 6 with the origins in the left 
column and the destinations in the top row: 
Table 6. Ethanol Transportation Costs 
Transportation Costs 
 New York California 
Brazil $0.12 $0.12 
Chicago by rail $0.11 $0.14 
Chicago by water $0.10e $0.145-0.155e 
Shipping cost estimates are denoted by an e following the cost. 
Objective 2 Conclusions 
 
 To meet the rapidly growing demand for ethanol due to the Renewable Fuels Standard, 
the US will have to make some changes to its transportation infrastructure, especially in the 
shipping industry. Even with those changes, ethanol imports will still occur. Since US ethanol 
consumption is currently exceeding production, there will be ethanol imports from Brazil as well 
as other countries, despite the current tariff. With or without a tariff, Brazilian ethanol is 
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competitive in the United States markets. Brazilian ethanol is $0.98 at US ports plus the $0.54 
tariff. This equals a price of $1.52; an extremely competitive price with ethanol currently selling 
for about $2.45 in Illinois (Ethanol Market Price). However, the U.S. markets are not flooded 
with Brazilian ethanol, because Brazil is using most of its ethanol domestically. Decreasing the 
U.S. import tariff will not significantly increase Brazilian ethanol imports as the author 
hypothesized.  
Objective 3 Introduction 
 
When analyzing the United States ethanol policy, the topic of subsidies will invariably be 
at the center of the debate. Currently, ethanol receives a blanket subsidy of $0.52 per gallon. This 
subsidy comes in the form of a tax break at the fuel pumps. Additionally, there are also three 
types of income tax credits for alcohol fuels: the alcohol blender’s tax credit, the straight alcohol 
credit for blends of 85% ethanol or larger, and the small ethanol producer’s credit for producers 
with a production capacity of 30 million gallons per year or smaller.  The subsidy focused on in 
this study is the tax break at the pumps. The current subsidy was originally created in the 1970s 
to support a new and growing industry. It does not take current oil or corn prices into 
consideration. This subsidy only applies up to a 10% blend of ethanol, so higher blends of 
ethanol cannot receive a higher subsidy (F.O. Licht and Agra CEAS Consulting 23). A 
conventional car engine can handle a higher blend of ethanol, such as 20% ethanol and 80% 
gasoline, but blenders will not make this blend because the subsidy would be no more than that 
of a 10% ethanol blend. Therefore, by subsidizing only a 10% blend, the current policy is 
limiting ethanol consumption. Now that the ethanol industry has developed and grown 
substantially in an era of high oil prices, it is less necessary to receive this support and protection 
 17
from imports (Rask). This study proposes a new subsidy policy that takes current corn and 
gasoline prices into consideration.  
Model 
 
The proposed subsidy policy is based on a breakeven point for ethanol plants, as well as 
the current corn and gasoline prices. The profitability of ethanol plants was calculated based on 
the following assumptions. Ethanol currently receives a $0.52 tax break at the pump. The point 
in which ethanol plants will breakeven on their investment and expenses will be different for 
plants with different production capacities. For this study, a plant with a 40 million gallon per 
year capacity, a typical size plant located in the Midwest, was used. However, a different 
capacity could easily be put into the equation. Fixed costs are based on plant and equipment 
investment of $2.50/ gallon of ethanol, depreciation over a 10-year period, a salvage value of 
zero, and an interest rate on investment of 10%. This results in $0.375/gal of fixed costs. 
Variable costs include feedstock (corn) costs, a credit for ethanol byproducts (distilled dried 
grains and carbon dioxide) revenues, and cash operating expenses. These costs were all obtained 
from the “USDA’s 2002 Ethanol Cost of Production Survey.” One bushel of corn will make 2.66 
gallons of ethanol. This results in the following equation: 
Total Cost =[FC + VC + (1/2.66 * Pc) – feedstock credits] * Qe, 
where Qe is the quantity of ethanol, Fc is fixed costs per ethanol gallon, VC is variable costs per 
ethanol gallon, and Pc is the price of corn. Inserting the numbers results in the following 
equation: 
Cost per Gallon = [0.375 + 0.41 + (1/2.66 * Pc) – 0.25]  
This can then be plotted on a graph: 
           
             
 
 18
 
 
 
 
                      Graph 1. 
Ethanol Production Costs based on Corn Prices
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
2.5
0 1 2 3 4
corn ($/bu)
et
ha
no
l (
$/
ga
l)
production
costs
production
costs
including
subsidy
 
  
The wholesale price of gasoline in 2005 and 2006 is plotted in graph 2.  
 
 Graph 2. 
TFC Commodity Charts 
Unleaded Gas (HU, NYMEX) 
Weekly Price Chart 
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The Chicago Board of Trade futures price of corn in 2005 and 2006 is plotted on graph 3.  
Graph 3. 
TFC Commodity Charts 
Corn (C, CBOT) 
Weekly Price Chart 
 20
 Currently, wholesale gasoline is selling for $1.55 per gallon (NYMEX).  The corn futures 
price is $2.39 per bushel (CBOT). Plotting this point on graph 1 shows that ethanol is currently 
cheaper than gasoline, so no subsidy is needed. The profit graph for ethanol producers can be 
reevaluated on a monthly or quarterly basis to determine the subsidy needed to keep ethanol 
competitive with gasoline.  For example: if the corn price moves to $2.75 per bushel and the 
gasoline price stays the same, ethanol will need a $0.04 subsidy to stay competitive with 
gasoline.  
Objective 3 Conclusions 
 
 The current ethanol subsidy policy is inefficient. Producers are making large profits due 
to low corn prices and high gasoline prices. As a result, producers are likely to be unhappy about 
a change in ethanol policy. The three income tax credits will allow producers to continue to get 
some support from the government. Still, if the subsidy is changed to be coupled with profits, 
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producers may see incentive to hide profits to get a higher subsidy. Therefore, this new subsidy 
policy must be accompanied by regulation of profits. Changing the subsidy policy will most 
likely not have an impact on the amount of ethanol being imported, since the proposed policy 
does not change the tariff and current imports get the same subsidy as domestically produced 
ethanol. By adopting a flexible subsidy model that changes as corn and gasoline prices fluctuate, 
the U.S. could still protect its ethanol industry as necessary, but not overcompensate ethanol 
producers.  
Study Conclusions 
 
 With an increased demand for energy in the world and stagnant petroleum production, 
high energy costs are unlikely to abate. To respond, the U.S. ethanol industry has been 
expanding its current production, which has positive effects on the local cash grain markets. 
Another reason for this U.S. production, despite the ability to import ethanol cheaper from 
Brazil, is Americans’ perception of homegrown fuels and an increased interest in less reliance in 
foreign sources of fuel. As long as consumption exceeds production, ethanol will also continue to 
be imported, despite the large tariff currently in place. The potential increased usage of ethanol 
as a replacement for MTBE and as an alternative fuel has the ability to use what the U.S. is 
producing domestically, as well as import some ethanol from Brazil. The largest change needed 
in the ethanol industry is a new subsidy policy. With a fixed subsidy, the government is wasting 
taxpayers’ money by subsidizing large profits for ethanol producers. By implementing a flexible 
subsidy policy, producers would get help from the government only as needed when indicated by 
gasoline and corn prices. The U.S. ethanol industry is only going to continue growing in the 
coming years. To meet the needs of this industry, ethanol policy must also continue to evolve.  
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